中文
By Rong Dan and Li Xing
China-U.S. dialogue based on mutual respect can help stabilize the global order, but European policymakers worry about being sidelined. Its challenge is to strengthen strategic autonomy and act on its own terms.
The September China-U.S. summit in Washington has attracted considerable attention across Europe. Euronews invoked the term "fear of missing out" to describe Europe's ambivalent response to Beijing and Washington engaging directly on major international issues.
U.S. President Donald Trump holds a welcome ceremony for Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is on a state visit to the United States, at the White House in Washington, D.C., the United States, Sept. 24, 2026. [Photo by Wang Ye/Xinhua]
On the one hand, Europe worries that bilateral negotiations on trade, critical raw materials and technology governance could sideline it in international rulemaking and weaken its bargaining position. On the other hand, it hopes that sustained China-U.S. dialogue will prevent Sino-U.S. competition from spiraling out of control and inflicting further damage on the global economic and security order.
This apparent contradiction defines Europe's core challenge amid shifting China-U.S. relations. Escalating competition brings economic and security costs, while direct coordination between the two major countries risks eroding Europe's voice in shaping the international agenda. Europe faces two sets of risks: unmanageable Sino-U.S. competition, and major-country bargains struck without sufficient European input.
Yet the European perspective is only one side of the story. China's stated approach to China-U.S. relations reflects a different view of direct bilateral engagement. China places greater emphasis on managing differences through mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. Beijing argues that the two countries should avoid confrontation, respect each other's legitimate interests and seek areas of cooperation.
Following the September summit, China and the U.S. endorsed the goal of a constructive relationship of strategic stability based on respect, fairness and reciprocity. For China, dialogue between the two countries poses no inherent threat to multilateralism or to other countries' interests and can help reduce uncertainty and support global stability. Beijing has also maintained that such engagement must be based on equality and mutual respect, rather than unilateral pressure or attempts to constrain China's development.
The distinction is important. The real question is whether bilateral cooperation between Washington and Beijing complements or displaces broader international consultation. Dialogue can reduce the risks of confrontation, but decisions taken without meaningful participation by affected parties may weaken the legitimacy and inclusiveness of international governance. Europe's concern therefore stems less from the existence of China-U.S. negotiations than from the possibility that bilateral coordination could diminish its strategic standing.
The European Union has long relied on its single market, transatlantic ties and commitment to multilateralism to secure an influential position in global trade and international rulemaking. Its bargaining leverage is partly shaped by the trajectory of China-U.S. relations: Washington may seek European support for restrictions on Chinese technology and supply-chain restructuring, while Beijing has an interest in preserving economic ties with Europe. But if Washington and Beijing address major differences directly, issues that previously required European cooperation or multilateral coordination may increasingly be handled through bilateral channels.
This concern also reflects the limits of Europe's regulatory power. Through its vast single market and sophisticated regulatory framework, the EU has developed what is widely known as the "Brussels Effect": the ability to influence global business practices and standards through its own rules. Yet the capacity to formulate rules does not automatically confer the power to set the international agenda.
Artificial intelligence offers a telling example. The EU was an early mover in AI regulation, adopting the AI Act. Meanwhile, the United States and China have explored direct dialogue on AI safety and major technological risks. The September summit also produced an agreement to establish a bilateral dialogue on AI, illustrating how Washington and Beijing can develop direct channels for managing emerging technological risks. Europe also faces a significant gap in data center infrastructure compared with the United States and China, constraining its ability to compete in the development and deployment of advanced AI. These differences highlight a broader limitation: regulatory influence depends not only on the quality of rules, but also on technological capabilities and the willingness of major countries to take those rules into account.
Europe's normative power has not become irrelevant. But the ability to shape international rules is not the same as the ability to determine how major countries coordinate on global issues. European policymakers increasingly fear that in AI, critical minerals and international trade, Europe may struggle to shape policy outcomes if decisive discussions take place primarily between Washington and Beijing. And Europe is deeply concerned about the prospect of moving from co-shaping the international agenda to adapting to decisions made elsewhere.
At the same time, Europe can hardly afford the costs of an escalating China-U.S. competition. Trade disputes, technological restrictions and export controls on critical resources can disrupt European supply chains and undermine economic security. As Europe pursues industrial transformation, energy restructuring and defense capacity-building, a more stable and predictable China-U.S. relationship would reduce external uncertainty and give it greater room to address domestic challenges.
During the September summit, Euronews also noted that heightened China-U.S. trade tensions could divert more Chinese goods toward European markets, potentially widening the EU's trade deficit with China. Europe remains heavily dependent on the United States and NATO for its security architecture, but cannot ignore China's market and its central role in global supply chains. The sharper the competition becomes, the more difficult it is for Europe to reconcile its security commitments with its economic interests. Sustained dialogue and effective management of differences, by contrast, could reduce external shocks and provide time for European industrial upgrading and policy coordination.
Europe is therefore not necessarily seeking comprehensive China-U.S. reconciliation. It wants competition to remain manageable, while preserving its own influence and avoiding excessive economic and security costs. It gains little from uncontrolled China-U.S. competition or bilateral settlements that leave it with scant input.
The implications extend beyond trade and technology to European security. A key concern for Europe is the prospect that the United States might reduce its involvement in the Ukraine crisis while pursuing closer engagement with Russia, intensifying European anxieties about over reliance on American security commitments. If Washington and Moscow were to make progress on their relationship without adequate consultation with European countries, Europe could be left to bear the consequences of security choices it had little opportunity to shape.
If China were invited to contribute to a broader settlement process alongside U.S.-Russia negotiations, it could draw on its stated support for equal participation by relevant parties, dialogue and the consideration of legitimate security concerns to advocate a more inclusive approach.
Ultimately, Europe's core test lies in its capacity to shape outcomes affecting its vital interests amid shifting China U.S. dynamics. As major-country relations evolve, strategic autonomy will depend on more than maintaining transatlantic ties or defending the EU's regulatory influence. It requires strengthened capacity for Europe to act, negotiate and cooperate with others on its own terms. When it comes to its China policy, Europe should advance three key priorities:
First, uphold strategic autonomy by pursuing an independent agenda on China, refrain from passive alignment amid U.S.-China competition, and follow the principle that EU-China relations are not targeted at, subjugated to, or controlled by any third party.
Second, give practical effect to multilateralism by promoting inclusive multi‑stakeholder consultations on AI, critical minerals, climate change, trade rules and so on, so as to safeguard broader multilateral governance.
Third, enhance competitiveness through open, pragmatic EU‑China cooperation on green transition and AI, avoid undue securitization and trade barriers, and mitigate supply‑chain disruptions.
Rong Dan is a lecturer at the Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.
Li Xing is a Yunshan Leading Scholar and director of the European Research Center at the Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.
