中文
By Moulik Jahan
The 2026 Global Governance Forum (Xiongan) unveiled eight cooperative actions under the Global Governance Initiative, putting forward shared pathways for developing nations to gain a stronger voice in global rule-making.
Global governance is facing a basic question: who makes the rules, and do those rules reflect the interests of the countries expected to follow them?
For many developing nations, the problem is their limited influence within international institutions over decisions on finance, trade, security and technology. China brought this concern to the center of the 2026 Global Governance Forum (Xiongan) in Xiongan New Area, Hebei province, held from Oct. 23 to 25. Nearly 400 representatives from more than 90 countries and international and regional organizations, including the United Nations, attended the gathering, which focused on reforming global governance and rebuilding confidence in international cooperation. The large number of global participants shows that more countries are interested in the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). They want global governance to be fairer and give developing countries a stronger voice.
This photo taken on Oct. 23, 2026 shows the opening ceremony of the 2026 Global Governance Forum (Xiong'an) in Xiong'an New Area, north China's Hebei Province. [Photo by Mu Yu/Xinhua]
China has consistently called for reforms that give developing countries a greater say in global affairs. From economic policy and climate change to access to digital technology, it has pushed for international cooperation that takes their needs seriously and gives them a fairer chance to share in the benefits of global development.
China's message was accompanied by a concrete list of proposed actions. In his address, Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined eight measures covering U.N. reform, Asia-Pacific trade, ocean conservation, human rights, outer space, artificial intelligence and research. The forum also produced the "Global Governance: Xiongan Vision" document and more than 450 proposals from Chinese and international participants, according to the organizers. Several institutions also released research reports, established dialogue mechanisms and launched cooperation projects. The forum brought together different professional and national perspectives through 22 thematic seminars and discussions spanning politics, economics, technology, culture and think tanks. These developments further flesh out the work agenda of the GGI, an open cooperation framework proposed by President Xi Jinping in September 2025. The question now is how much of that program can be translated into lasting results through collective effort.
In his message to the forum, Xi warned that deficits in peace, development, security and governance were growing rather than diminishing. He called for extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, stressing that countries must pool their strength and tackle common challenges through cooperation.
His message was not that existing institutions should be discarded. It was that they need to respond more effectively to the world as it is today, including the changing weight and aspirations of developing economies.
Wang said that more than 160 countries and international organizations had endorsed the GGI, while more than 60 countries had joined the Group of Friends of Global Governance. He also said that elements of the initiative had been incorporated into documents issued by the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. The shared challenge for all stakeholders is to convert this political support into negotiations, working arrangements and decisions that can be assessed against clear results.
The first of Wang's eight proposed actions concerns the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting scheduled for November. China is actively advancing work around openness, innovation and cooperation, and working with other APEC economies toward building an Asia-Pacific community and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. This agenda has an immediate economic dimension. Regional production networks depend on predictable market access, efficient logistics and rules that allow businesses in different economies to trade and invest. Progress will therefore be judged less by the language of declarations than by whether economies can identify practical areas for closer integration.
The second action is continued engagement in United Nations reform, including efforts to streamline the organization and improve its efficiency. The third is to give the Group of Friends of Global Governance a larger role through activities focused on nine reform priorities and by encouraging more countries to participate. Together, these measures show that Beijing wants to work through established multilateral structures while building wider support for changes within them.
The question of representation is central to that effort. Wang argued that developing countries should have a greater say in international affairs and called for reform of the international financial system. He also supported changes to the U.N. Security Council that would increase developing-country representation, with particular attention to Africa's aspirations, and urged greater involvement by small- and medium-sized countries in global decision-making. These demands reflect a longstanding concern among developing economies: their economic and diplomatic importance has grown, but their influence over some international institutions has not kept pace.
Broader Global South representation, in turn, could help build a wider coalition to advance multilateral reform, a goal China actively supports. For developing countries, however, the value of this approach will depend on whether it gives them more influence over actual decisions. Representation matters most when it affects the allocation of resources, access to markets, development priorities and the rules governing emerging technologies.
The fourth action focuses on the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, known as the BBNJ Agreement. Wang pledged to work for its full and effective implementation and expressed support for Xiamen's bid to host the agreement's secretariat. The issue extends governance beyond national waters, where conservation requires scientific cooperation and agreement on how marine resources should be used.
The fifth action concerns human rights governance. As developing countries seek to give the right to development greater prominence on the multilateral agenda, China will organize a workshop on economic, social and cultural rights to strengthen other developing countries' capacity. This reflects Beijing's emphasis on development as an important part of the human rights discussion. The proposal will be more consequential if it helps countries exchange practical experience and strengthens their ability to pursue social and economic objectives.
The sixth action addresses outer space. China released a position paper calling for strengthened outer-space governance, arguing that international rules should keep pace with exploration, involve broad participation and benefit all countries. The announcement reflects a wider concern that technological advances can move faster than the rules needed to manage them. Outer space, like the deep sea, presents questions that cannot be settled by one country acting alone. International cooperation will be needed to maintain peaceful uses and ensure that the development of new capabilities does not exclude countries with fewer resources.
Artificial intelligence is the focus of the seventh action. China will release a progress report on its AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, reviewing cooperation outcomes, practical experience and specific cases from the plan's two years of activity. The intention is to encourage deeper international cooperation on AI. For developing economies, the issue is how to gain access to computing capacity, technical knowledge and skills. Beyond regulation, international cooperation will need to address risks while allowing more countries to participate in the economic benefits of AI.
The eighth action is the establishment of a Global Governance Research Center. The center is intended to study major theoretical and practical questions, release a Global Governance Index and compile annual reports. This could become one of the forum's most useful initiatives if its research provides a consistent way to assess progress. A meaningful index will require transparent methods, reliable data and indicators that allow countries to distinguish announced commitments from implemented reforms. Such evidence would help move the governance debate away from competing claims and toward a clearer assessment of what works.
The forum's closing document, "Global Governance: Xiongan Vision," brought together proposals on the United Nations, development, economic and financial governance, trade and emerging technologies. Organizers reported more than 450 proposals, alongside research publications, dialogue mechanisms and cooperation projects. These are tangible outcomes of the gathering, but the distinction between proposals and adopted international commitments matters. The vision is not a binding treaty, and the proposals will need further work by governments and institutions before they can produce wider changes.
At the forum, China also outlined measures it has already taken. Wang cited its decision to forgo new special and differential treatment in ongoing and future World Trade Organization negotiations, as well as zero-tariff access for African countries and least-developed countries that maintain diplomatic relations with China. He also referred to the International Organization for Mediation and the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, both initiated by China. These initiatives operate in different fields, from trade and dispute resolution to technological cooperation, and should be assessed individually through their implementation, participation and practical effects.
Xiongan itself provided a setting for the discussion of governance in practice. Established in 2017, the new area represents a long-term Chinese effort in urban planning, infrastructure, public services and development. Its inclusion in the forum's name connected the international discussion to a domestic project built around long-term planning. The experience may offer material for international exchange, though countries will naturally need to adapt lessons to their own institutions, financial resources and social conditions.
Progress on global governance reform will ultimately be measured by collective follow-up after the forum. The eight actions offer a working agenda; the Xiongan Vision provides a shared reference point; and the reported support for the GGI suggests that the initiative has gained attention beyond China. But the harder work lies ahead: securing agreement, sustaining cooperation and showing that reform can improve the way international institutions serve their members.
The most important outcome of Xiongan will not be the number of proposals announced over three days. It will be whether those proposals lead to more effective institutions, a stronger voice for developing countries and practical cooperation in areas where no country can succeed alone.
The forum has outlined shared directions for collective pursuit. The task ahead for all stakeholders is to work together to translate this shared vision and its objectives into tangible outcomes.
Moulik Jahan is a Bangladeshi independent researcher, freelance columnist, and strategic and security affairs analyst.
