中文
By Mohamed Karim
Steadier ties between BRICS' two demographic giants and leading economies leave the grouping free to focus on development after the New Delhi summit. The test now is whether it delivers for the Global South.
The 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi has ended, but its importance will be measured less by the language of the declaration than by what happens next. At a moment when the world economy is being reshaped by geopolitical tensions, fragmented supply chains, technological competition and growing uncertainty, BRICS faces a straightforward test: can it turn its political influence into practical development opportunities for the Global South?
The summit suggests that the answer can be yes. Twenty-five years ago, BRIC was just a market and economic concept coined by Jim O'Neill, an economist at Goldman Sachs; BRICS came into being after South Africa joined in 2010. Today, its members span four continents, represent nearly half of the world's population, account for about 30% of global economic output and generate more than half of global economic growth. The grouping has therefore outgrown the question of whether it matters. The question now is what it should do with its weight.
Leaders of the BRICS countries pose for a group photo during the Session I of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, Sept. 12, 2026. [Photo by Wang Ye/Xinhua]
Chinese President Xi Jinping offered a clear answer in New Delhi. BRICS, he said, should be a pioneer in advancing innovation-driven development, upholding peace and stability, facilitating mutual learning among civilizations and improving global governance. These are not abstract ambitions. They reflect a recognition that the Global South is gaining economic weight but still faces serious disadvantages in technology, finance, industrial capacity and representation in international institutions.
That gap between economic weight and institutional influence is precisely where BRICS can make a difference. The New Delhi Declaration reaffirmed support for multilateralism, international law, a stronger role for the United Nations and reforms to global governance institutions. It also stressed sovereign equality, noninterference and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Xi called for reforms to the international financial architecture, so developing countries have a greater voice and for World Trade Organization reform to move in the right direction.
Yet China's most remarkable contribution to the summit went beyond political language to the economic mechanisms that deeper cooperation among Global South countries would need. Xi proposed five initiatives covering artificial intelligence, trade and investment, the digital economy, intelligent manufacturing, and talent development. They share a common thread: development now depends not only on access to markets, but also on the ability to create, process and apply technology.
Consider AI. China proposed establishing a BRICS AI open-source community, supporting the development and application of large language models, organizing specialized seminars and training courses and building an open AI ecosystem. For developing countries, this is more than a technology proposal. AI could either narrow existing development gaps or create another one. Countries able to build and adapt AI systems will gain advantages in productivity, education, health care, manufacturing and public administration; those unable to do so risk becoming dependent technology consumers.
Open-source cooperation and training cannot solve that problem overnight, but they can lower the entry barrier. The principle is important: technological progress should not become another preserve of a handful of countries and corporations.
The same practical thinking runs through the other initiatives. A BRICS special economic zone partnership could improve policy coordination and create a new frontier for open development. China plans to host a BRICS Forum on Trade in Services in 2027. A digital ecosystem cloud platform would facilitate skills training, technology exchanges and industrial cooperation. China has also offered to help BRICS members build smart factories and develop manufacturing standards. An engineer cultivation alliance and a youth exchange program focused on scientific and technological innovation would address another problem that receives less attention than capital or machinery: the shortage of skilled workers capable of putting new technology to work.
This is where BRICS can become genuinely useful to the Global South. It does not need to become a closed economic bloc. Its value lies in giving developing economies more options.
That principle is particularly relevant to supply chains. Xi called for stable and smooth industrial and supply chains and a larger integrated BRICS market. The logic is straightforward. A fragmented world economy raises costs for everyone, but developing economies generally have less capacity to absorb those costs. Greater connectivity among BRICS members can provide alternative markets, suppliers, investment channels and production partnerships. China's own trade experience illustrates the scale of this transformation. In the first half of 2025, China's trade with Belt and Road partner countries reached 11.29 trillion yuan ($1.57 trillion), or 51.8% of China's total foreign trade, up 4.7% year on year. The broader lesson is that economic resilience increasingly comes from diversified connections rather than isolation.
Another development in New Delhi deserves equal attention: the meeting between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The two leaders have now met for three consecutive years, following their meetings in Kazan in 2024 and Tianjin in 2025. Their latest conversation did not eliminate differences between China and India. Nor should anyone expect it to. Its importance lies elsewhere, in the decision to manage those differences while protecting the larger relationship.
Xi said China and India should draw on each other's strengths, support each other and develop together. Modi stressed India's independent foreign policy and said India's relationship with China is not determined by any third party. Both sides agreed that development should remain the greatest common denominator, that economic and trade relations should develop steadily and that the two countries should support each other's BRICS chairmanships.
The economic reality behind this political message is substantial. China-India trade reached about $155.6 billion in 2025, according to Chinese customs data. This figure demonstrates why sustained engagement matters: economic interdependence between the world's two most populous countries is already too significant to be treated as secondary to strategic disagreements.
For BRICS, greater stability between China and India could have a wider effect. When the two members can keep channels of communication open, cooperate on trade and supply chains, encourage business contacts and support connectivity, the entire grouping gains room to concentrate on development rather than internal friction.
This will become especially important in 2027, when China takes over the BRICS chairmanship and hosts the 19th summit. China has hosted BRICS summits three times before. But the next chairmanship comes at a different moment. BRICS is larger, more influential and more diverse than it was when the mechanism began. The challenge is therefore not simply to organize another summit. It is to turn expansion into effectiveness.
China's five initiatives provide one possible roadmap. The coming chairmanship can focus on measurable results: easier trade, stronger services cooperation, functioning digital platforms, technology exchanges, smart manufacturing projects, engineering training and more practical cooperation on AI. The standard should be tangible outcomes rather than the number of meetings held or statements issued. This is also why BRICS should not be defined primarily through confrontation with the West or any other group of countries. Such a description is too narrow for what the mechanism has become. BRICS brings together countries with different political systems, economic structures and foreign policy priorities. Its strength lies precisely in the fact that cooperation does not require uniformity.
At 20, BRICS has reached the point where solidarity must acquire an economic vocabulary: factories, skills, standards, investment, digital infrastructure, supply chains and market access. Political coordination remains important, but development is what will determine whether ordinary people in the Global South ultimately feel the benefits of BRICS. The New Delhi summit has laid part of that foundation. China's assumption of the chairmanship in 2027 offers an opportunity to champion its realization. And the gradual stabilization of China-India relations removes one of the obstacles that could otherwise limit the grouping's effectiveness.
The next decade of BRICS should therefore be judged by a simple measure: whether cooperation expands the development choices available to the Global South. If it can connect technology with talent, factories with markets, trade with connectivity and political voice with economic capacity, BRICS will have done more than mark the beginning of a "third golden decade." It will have given that phrase substance. The real promise emerging from New Delhi is a stronger development platform for a changing world rather than a new geopolitical camp.
Mohamed Karim is an independent researcher and analyst on global issues and economic affairs based in Benghazi, Libya.
