中文
Lead: As the U.S. doubles down on "peace through strength" and economic coercion, China is reshaping global governance by offering countries genuine partnerships based on sovereign equality and mutual respect.
By Maya Majueran
The international landscape in 2025 was marked not only by policy differences but also by two evolving approaches to global order. The United States emphasizes a unilateral, security-focused framework outlined in its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). Meanwhile, China highlights a vision of cooperative multilateral engagement through initiatives such as the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Governance Initiative (GGI).
These developments should not be simplistically framed as a geopolitical dispute. They point to a broader process in which countries are exploring different approaches to global governance and determining which elements best suit their priorities for the 21st century.
The 2025 NSS outlines a strongly national-interest-driven vision. It characterizes the international environment as one defined by strategic competition, where the effective use of power is central. Its core objectives include protecting the U.S.'s own sovereignty, strengthening borders, revitalizing domestic industry, and pursuing reciprocity in relations with allies and rivals. The document also critiques "globalist overreach," positioning multilateralism as a selective instrument to be applied when it yields concrete advantages for the U.S.
Its operational logic is "peace through strength," pursued through two integrated levers of dominance. First, the pursuit of unchallengeable military supremacy — a force so technologically advanced and globally deployed that it aims to render conflict unthinkable for any rival. Second, the aggressive use of economic statecraft as a weapon, including sanctions, export controls, and tariff policies, designed to constrain adversaries, secure supply chains, and coerce behavioral change. This creates a high-stakes, multi-domain deterrence, confronting challengers with unacceptable costs across all arenas. The underlying message is stark: The U.S. will lead, but strictly on its own terms, and the global order will be upheld not through consensus but through the unwavering assertion of American primacy.
China's contrasting proposal, articulated through the GSI and the GGI, presents a strikingly different path, one that masterfully leverages the language of inclusion against the established order. The GSI serves as the diplomatic framework, advocating for "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security." It formally rejects foreign interventionism and exclusive military alliances, positioning itself as a defender of state sovereignty and a proponent of dialogue. In doing so, it directly critiques the U.S.-led alliance network as a destabilizing relic of Cold War thinking.
The central driver of this vision is the GGI. While the GSI is more focused on how to achieve common security in the world today, the GGI outlines a structure for better global governance. It emphasizes sovereign equality, consensus-oriented decision-making, and a people-centered development approach that avoids political preconditions. This model contrasts with the Western liberal order, which has traditionally tied assistance, market access and integration to standards related to democracy and human rights.
For many countries in the Global South, China's approach is viewed less as a strategic challenge and more as an alternative to aspects of the current system they find unresponsive to their needs. It is often regarded as more attentive to their sovereignty and development priorities. Whereas the Washington-led model is commonly associated with governance conditions, fiscal reform expectations, and broader geopolitical considerations, China presents its model as emphasizing fairness, inclusivity, and multilateral cooperation. This cooperation includes giving greater voice to developing nations, supporting the equal application of international law, addressing the North-South gap and promoting collaboration on global peace and development. In this context, the vision of a more just and equitable global governance system — what China describes as a community with a shared future for humanity — has gained visibility among many developing countries.
This message resonates with leaders who view Western conditions as overly prescriptive and seek greater emphasis on concrete economic outcomes — such as ports, power systems and digital infrastructure — than on political reforms. China's portrayal of itself as a developing country that achieved rapid growth without Westernized political liberalization further enhances the appeal of its model, suggesting that there are viable pathways to development and influence beyond the traditional Western approach.
China's offer is straightforward: infrastructure without political conditions, investment without ideological requirements, and participation in forums where it asserts that all states have an equal voice. Its broader aim is often described as seeking to adjust existing institutions, such as the U.N., to better reflect the perspectives of the Global South. China is also supporting the development of additional bodies, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which aim to provide platforms for cooperation among countries regardless of their size, economic weight, or population. This represents a long-term strategy focused on shaping governance frameworks, deepening interdependence and gradually influencing the rules that govern technology, finance and security.
The differences between the two approaches are significant and structural in nature. The American model emphasizes order through leadership, relying on a hierarchical system in which stability is supported by its own dominant power. The Chinese model prioritizes influence through institutional design, favoring a more network-oriented framework where stability arises from commonly agreed rules — rules that tend to limit external interference. Both speak in terms of "sovereignty," yet they define it in markedly different ways. For Washington, sovereignty often justifies unilateral action to safeguard national interests. For Beijing, it serves as a collective principle for countries seeking to get rid of outside pressure and political conditionality.
This leaves the world, particularly the "swing states" of the Global South, navigating how best to interact with these evolving frameworks. Ultimately, their decisions will rest on a central question: which system they trust to best support their long-term interests.
This dynamic is already unfolding, not on conventional battlefields but in boardrooms, standard-setting institutions, development finance agencies and diplomatic forums around the world. Its outcome will shape whether the coming decades are marked by a managed form of bipolarity or by a more diffuse multipolar landscape governed by overlapping sets of rules.
In this environment, countries are weighing how best to leverage their strategic autonomy. Trade agreements, infrastructure financing and security partnerships are increasingly interpreted as indications of which vision of the future a country leans toward. Nations are not only selecting partners; they are aligning themselves with the underlying principles that may shape the reformed global order.
Maya Majueran is the founding director of the Belt and Road Initiative Sri Lanka (BRISL), a pioneering organization dedicated to research, dialogue, and engagement on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Alongside his leadership role, Majueran is a researcher and commentator on international relations, economics and geopolitics, with a particular focus on the evolving role of Asia and the Global South in world affairs.
