中文
By Li Xing and Liu Bin
Lead: Japan's clumsy attempt to link China's Taiwan region to its own survival underscores the paranoia gripping Tokyo's right-wing establishment as China rises.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated during a parliamentary defense session on Nov. 7 that a "Taiwan emergency" could constitute a "survival-threatening situation," allowing the country to exercise its right to collective self-defense. In subsequent parliamentary questioning, she doubled down on her statement, firmly refusing to retract it.
The term "survival-threatening situation" denotes a situation in which Japan, even without being directly attacked, judges that an assault on the United States or another closely allied nation endangers Japan's survival so much that it may invoke the right to collective self-defense. By extending this logic to Taiwan — an inalienable part of Chinese territory— Takaichi effectively cast China's pursuit of national reunification as a direct challenge to Japan's national security. This marks the first time a sitting Japanese prime minister has publicly and explicitly articulated such a position on Taiwan. In response, China has seriously denounced the statement as undermining the political foundations of bilateral relations.
As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said on Nov. 19, "The erroneous remarks of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Taiwan grossly interfere in China's internal affairs, trample on international law and basic norms in international relations, and challenge the post-WWII international order. "She further emphasized that a country like this is in no position to take up the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and is unfit for permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council.
The questions we raise here are: What psychological anxieties and ambitions underlie Takaichi's remarks? Do her words reflect a broader sense of collective unease within Japan's right-wing political establishment, attributed to China's global ascent, the perceived intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition, and a growing regional perception that the balance of power is increasingly shifting in China's favor?
The anxieties of Japan's right-wing forces are further intensified by the fact that China was the only major country to effectively withstand the Trump administration's global tariff offensive — an outcome that reinforced the global perception of China as a true influential power equal to the United States. This dynamic may, in turn, have amplified Japanese concerns about both the capability and the willingness of Washington to continue providing reliable protection for its regional allies at a time when the United States appears increasingly inclined toward strategic retrenchment.
Moreover, it is no secret that the right-wing forces want to see disruption of the rise of China through escalation of China-U.S. tensions or an armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait. They are trying to revive the wartime militarism in Japan and Takaichi has even hinted at a possible shift in the country's decades-old non-nuclear principles.
China's ascent and the broader shift toward multipolarity in East Asia have increasingly eroded Japan's traditional sphere of influence, weakening its sense of security and its sense of superiority it once derived from the post-Cold War unipolar order. Should Washington continue its shift toward burden reduction, Japan's security anxieties are set to intensify on multiple fronts. Japanese policymakers also fear that Washington may increasingly treat Japan as a mere pawn, with potential China-U.S. conciliations in global governance coming at the expense of Japan's strategic interests.
The meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Trump in Busan on Oct. 30 underscored a tentative stabilization in China-U.S. relations, symbolizing a moment of bilateral equilibrium. Tokyo now faces the challenge of navigating a regional order in which China's influence continues to grow while U.S. commitment becomes less predictable — a situation that further intensifies Japan's anxieties.
Against this backdrop, Takaichi's remarks not only reflect this mounting sense of vulnerability, but also signal an effort to bolster Japan's geopolitical strengths by tightening the U.S.-Japan alliance and asserting a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Most importantly, they underlie the aspiration of the right-wingers to get rid of the constraint of Japan's peace constitution, Article 9of which stipulates clearly that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."
Under the pressure of mounting strategic anxiety and against the changing geopolitical landscape in the region, right-wing forces led by Takaichi have increasingly gravitated toward more hardline positions. They seek to broaden Japan's collective right of self-defense, assert a normalized right to use force, expand military capabilities, and reclaim a sense of national agency and security through what amounts to a high-risk strategic gamble, particularly in their articulation of the Taiwan question. Japan's heightened sensitivity to China's reunification agenda reflects not only concerns over sea lanes and proximity but also a deeper fear that a reunified China would irreversibly tilt the regional balance of power. In Tokyo's political imagination, the Taiwan question has come to symbolize the broader trajectory of China's ascent.
Takaichi's remarks can be seen as symptomatic of a broader phenomenon increasingly visible within segments of Japan's political establishment, often referred to as the "China syndrome." This syndrome describes a psychological and political pattern in which China's rise generates exaggerated threat perceptions, emotional overreactions, and performative provocations that exceed objective strategic assessments. It reflects heightened anxieties, internalized fears, and structural insecurities within Japan's ruling establishment as it confronts China's growing strength, uncertainties in U.S. strategic commitments, and the erosion of the post-Cold War regional order that once provided greater strategic comfort.
The syndrome is particularly visible in the way Taiwan has become a symbolic focal point for Japan's calculations. Rather than responding to concrete Chinese actions, political figures such as Takaichi invoke the "Taiwan crisis" as an existential threat, projecting broader apprehensions about China onto Taiwan. In this sense, Taiwan is less a matter of direct Japanese security interests and more a stage on which the psychological dynamics of the "China syndrome" are expressed. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for interpreting why statements like Takaichi's have gained traction domestically and why these patterns are increasingly prominent in Japan's political discourse.
For China, dealing with the situation calls for firm and clear measures to deter Japan from testing established red lines and to reaffirm the historical and political foundations of bilateral relations. China's position is crystal clear that the Taiwan question is unequivocally an internal matter rooted in longstanding historical, legal, and political foundations. China firmly maintains that Taiwan has always been an inseparable part of China and that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing all of China. On this basis, the question of China's reunification falls entirely within China's sovereign right to manage its own domestic affairs, leaving no legitimate space for any external interference — whether through political statements, arms sales or military involvement.
In this connection, any attempt by outside powers to influence the Taiwan question not only contravenes the principles of the U.N. Charter, especially those concerning sovereignty and non-interference, but also risks destabilizing the delicate peace across the Taiwan Strait. Accordingly, China clearly posits that a stable regional order depends on strict adherence to the one-China principle and on foreign actors refraining from actions that, in China's judgment, encourage "Taiwan independence" separatists in Taiwan or alter the status quo.
In conclusion, Japan's evolving security discourse increasingly links its own strategic future to Taiwan's geopolitical position and continued rise of China, reflecting Tokyo's anxieties and ambitions amid a shifting regional balance of power. Yet, it must be emphasized that Taiwan is an integral part of China and that the question of reunification — through peaceful or other means — falls solely within China's sovereign jurisdiction. It must also be pointed that Japan should accept the rise of China and seek to get along well with its neighbor instead of trying in vain to disrupt its further ascent.
Li Xing is a Yunshan leading scholar and director of the European Research Center at Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. He is also an adjunct professor of international relations at Aalborg University in Denmark.
Liu Bin is an associate professor at the European Research Center at Guangdong Institute for International Strategies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.
