By Nikola Mikovic
On March 1, following a chaotic "debate" in Washington, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy received a warm welcome at No. 10 Downing Street during his meeting with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In just 20 seconds, Zelenskyy thanked the UK three times. The two leaders later signed a £2.26 billion loan for the Ukrainian military.
"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal," former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said. Zelenskyy seems to have learned this the hard way.
Ever since the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalated in February 2022, Zelenskyy has enjoyed widespread popularity in the West, including the United States. He was welcomed and firmly supported by virtually all Western leaders and his country received billions of dollars and euros to fight against Russia. But U.S. President Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025 seems to have changed Washington's approach toward Zelenskyy.
The Ukrainian leader's latest meeting with Trump and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the White House has clearly shown that Zelenskyy can no longer count on the Trump administration's full support. Their verbal clash in the Oval Office represented a humiliation for both Zelenskyy and Trump.
The Ukrainian president was repeatedly accused by American officials of "disrespecting" the United States. Indeed, no U.S. president is accustomed to arguing in front of cameras, especially in the symbolic setting of the White House. Trump, however, used the rhetoric his voters like to hear – portraying himself as a "peacemaker," insulting his predecessor Joe Biden, telling Zelenskyy to be "more thankful" for U.S. support and accusing him of "gambling with World War III."
Zelenskyy, by contrast, may be remembered as a leader who publicly resisted U.S. pressure in Washington – despite Ukraine's heavy reliance on American support. Due to the heated standoff with Trump and Vance, he was "kicked out" of the White House.
Zelenskyy would be unlikely to take such a hard stance toward Trump if he weren't firmly backed by Europe, as well as parts of the American establishment. Still, because of his quarrel with Trump and Vance, no minerals deal between Washington and Kyiv has been signed, which means that Ukraine, at least for the time being, will not have to give its natural resources to the United States.
Consequently, it remains unclear whether the U.S. will continue funding and arming Ukraine in the same way it has for the past three years. The Trump administration is reportedly considering ending all ongoing shipments of military aid to Ukraine, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was instructed by the State Department to terminate initiatives set to help restore the former Soviet republic's energy grid.
But even if Washington completely halts its support for Kyiv, that does not necessarily mean that Ukraine will collapse. The European Union, unlike the U.S., has repeatedly signaled that it does not intend to abandon Kyiv.
Following the meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump, most European leaders have openly sided with the Ukrainian President. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told him to "be strong, brave and fearless." Previously, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Ankara is "in favor of Ukraine being a member of NATO," which suggests that Kyiv can also count on NATO's second-largest military support.
More importantly, leaders from around Europe, as well as Türkiye, NATO and the EU, have been invited to the summit in London on March 2 "to drive forward European action on Ukraine." What they reportedly aim to secure is "a just and enduring peace, and a lasting deal, that ensures Ukraine's future sovereignty and security." Trump, on the other hand, is pushing Kyiv to de facto freeze the conflict and make concessions, which is what neither Ukraine nor Europe are willing to accept.
Therefore, the fundamental difference between Trump's and Europe's approach is that the EU seeks sustained support for Ukraine to bolster its negotiating position, while the Trump administration wants a ceasefire at any cost.
The problem, however, is that the EU, as well as other Kyiv backers, might not have the capacity to provide as much aid to Ukraine as it needs. That could be resolved in a way Trump would undoubtedly appreciate: Europe purchasing expensive American weapons and giving them to Ukraine.
In parallel, European countries are expected to strengthen their military-industrial complex, and possibly even form a new defense partnership, independent of the United States. They will likely find ways to increase their support for Ukraine at least until 2026, when the U.S. midterm election will take place, hoping that Trump's positions at home will significantly weaken as a result of the vote.
In the long term, as military force is likely to regain primacy over diplomacy, a larger war in Europe should not be ruled out. European leaders seem to have been aware of such a possibility a long time ago.
In March 2024, the European Commission proposed ways for the EU to boost its arms industry so it can shift to "war economy mode", while French President Emmanuel Macron stressed that a moment was being approached "in our Europe where it will be appropriate not to be a coward," pointing out that "the war has returned to our soil."
The Trump administration does not seem willing to be directly involved in such a conflict, although it will undoubtedly seek to benefit from it.
At this point, Washington's interest does not seem to be a direct military confrontation with the Russian Federation, but rather an outcome in which all actors – Russia, Ukraine and Europe – will come out weaker. But since Trump does not enjoy full support in American society, and parts of the U.S. elites as well as most of Washington's allies oppose his actions, he may get the short end of the stick in this game.
Nikola Mikovic, a special commentator on current affairs for CGTN, is a freelance journalist in Serbia, covering mostly Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian foreign policy issues.