中文
By Josef Gregory Mahoney
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill that would give Taiwan a massive increase in military aid — $6.5 billion over five years — and threaten to sanction China's five largest state-owned banks in response to any "escalating hostile actions in or against Taiwan."
The bill still has to pass the Senate and be reconciled with a House version before it could be signed into law. Along the way, some elements may be dropped in negotiations to garner necessary support, especially from the White House. Nevertheless, the fact that it was cleared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a dark sign of where things stand presently and where they seem to be going.
Will it pass Congress, would Biden sign it?
Will the law, as currently written, pass both chambers and be signed into law? On the one hand, the two key elements — the enormous increase in money plus the sanctions clause — would be very provocative and damaging to Chinese security. On the other hand, Washington is in a provocative mood. We need to put this legislation in context to see how it fits into the broader trend of the U.S. preparing for conflict.
Having emerged in the Senate is already a bad sign. First, the Senate is generally much more conservative and less reactionary than the House. If this had been proposed first in the House, then it might be reasonable to suspect it would be watered down in the Senate. Indeed, the two chambers are designed to work in this way, where the House reflects the more emotional side of politics and the Senate the more rational.
Second, because Nancy Pelosi is still the Speaker of the House, and because we know her agenda toward Taiwan very clearly, we now might expect a House version that makes the Senate look tame. In other words, we might expect the House to be even more provocative, making the Senate bill look less provocative and more politically palatable to the White House — while understanding the Senate version as it stands would further undermine already damaged China-U.S. relations.
Third, this is an election year in both China and the U.S. With the upcoming 20th CPC National Congress set to determine who will lead China over the next five years, it's been clear for some time the U.S. has explicitly endeavored to embarrass Chinese leaders whenever possible to undermine their popularity and legitimacy, if not in China itself, then certainly in global opinion. We should expect this legislation as well as other activities, for example, planned high-altitude U.S.-Indian joint military exercises on China's border in October, which are deliberately sequenced on top of those that have already taken place, to continue to pressure Chinese leaders during this period when they are emphasizing stability.
Of course, the U.S. is also facing an election a month after China's — one that is worrisome due to the high degree of political polarization. Midterm elections are typically referendums on the president's first two years in office, and many believe the Democrats will be punished given Biden's low approval ratings. However, "being tough against China" is the one issue that both parties support. Consequently, in this year especially, we should anticipate bills like this one passing as well as others that risk new escalations.
Fourth, this legislation appears consistent with a larger strategy already at work. The U.S. keeps meddling in issues related to sovereignty and security, whether Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, or Taiwan and deliberately because Washington knows this will provoke the strongest responses from China. However, these efforts also go hand-in-hand with initiatives like the QUAD, enticing India into the so-called Indo-Pacific, expanding joint drills with South Korea and upgrading controversial missiles there, supporting Japan's transition to an attack-capable military, proliferating nuclear submarines to Australia via AUKUS, and advancing technology and industrial decoupling efforts.
Accordingly, if a bill like the current Senate version reaches Biden's desk, will it be surprising if he signs it? Of course, he might resist for two reasons: First, presidents generally oppose Congress dictating foreign policy; second, the Administration has already signaled that they think the Senate version represents a dangerous provocation.
However, there is something fishy about the legislation because it has emerged in the Senate, where Biden was long a leader. It's even fishier due to well-founded suspicions that Biden may have privately encouraged Pelosi's recent visit to Taiwan despite suggesting otherwise. After all, he mobilized significant U.S. military support for her trip and did not walk back any of the statements she made in Taiwan.
Therefore, while general anti-China hysteria might explain the Senate's legislation, it's also plausible that it's part of an all-hands, well-sequenced, highly coordinated containment strategy orchestrated by the White House and involving both chambers of Congress. Thus, it would be more surprising if Biden did not sign it with half-spoken references to respecting Congress while bolstering his "get tough on China" credentials once again.
Fifth, this legislation is advancing while the U.S. feels more confident about its proxy war in Ukraine. The conflict is going poorly for Moscow due to recent setbacks. Moreover, the U.S. has aligned NATO with other leading economies against Moscow. Therefore, the prospects of an outcome favoring Russian interests seem somewhat remote.
Indeed, many in Beijing are studying how the U.S. both provoked and responded to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Meanwhile, many in the U.S. are comparing the situation in Ukraine with what they anticipate will follow in Taiwan. The two cases are dissimilar, most notably the much more prominent role China plays in the global economy, along with various key historical and geographical differences between Taiwan and Ukraine. That said, discussions of the Senate bill clearly link Taiwan and Ukraine, with some in Washington saying the U.S. should prepare ahead of time instead of waiting until a conflict to respond.
Will the bill trigger more escalations?
Of course, if this bill becomes law, it would further undermine "strategic ambiguity." Could it also trigger more escalations? On the one hand, if a conflict happens, then we should expect the U.S. to try to do unto China as it has done unto Russia, in broad strokes at least. Consequently, the bill's proposed sanctions would be eclipsed by even greater strikes at China's economy and financial systems.
On the other hand, even if this bill doesn't become law, it will be evaluated by international businesses and foreign governments as a growing political risk that will discourage trade with China and support America's decoupling campaign. This by itself is already an escalation, as is the provocative message it sends concerning China's general red lines regarding Taiwan. Further, will it invite some reciprocal response from Beijing, as is often the case?
Finally, given the vagueness of the bill's wording, what sort of activity might be regarded as "escalating hostile actions in or against Taiwan?" For example, Beijing's responses to Pelosi's visit alone could be judged as fitting that description and deemed a legal trigger for the sort of U.S. responses the bill would require.
Josef Gregory Mahoney is a professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University and a senior research fellow with the Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Southeast University.
