中文
This is an editorial from China Daily.
The US Navy fired the commanding officer, executive officer and the chief sonar technician of the USS Connecticut on Thursday, after the Seawolf-class nuclear-powered attack submarine crashed into "an uncharted seamount" in the South China Sea on Oct 2.
Karl Thomas, commander of the US Seventh Fleet, had determined that "sound judgment, prudent decision-making and adherence to required procedures in navigation planning, watch team execution and risk management could have prevented the incident", the fleet said in a statement.
The language is essentially the same as that used after the fatal collisions of the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain with civilian vessels.
It seems unlikely that the lax discipline and a willful disregard of proper procedures that seems rife in the US Navy was the direct cause of the accident this time. Rather it appears that the three officers are being made scapegoats for the high-profile incident so that it can be blamed on human error, rather than the provocative nature of the submarine's mission.
Although the United States has refused to disclose where the crash happened in the South China Sea, it is not difficult for oceanographers to chart the dozens of spots in the waters where seamounts are high enough to reach the deepest cruising depth of the submarine — about 400 meters — particularly those that have not yet been mapped by the US. Since almost all of those mounts are close to Chinese islands or the mainland, the submarine would have had to operate covertly, relying on its own sonar system to navigate.
Although the submarine is "outfitted with the latest electronic gadgetry only available when price is not a consideration" as some reports have stated, the crew would have had to avoid using the sonar system as much as possible as the noise it produces would have given away the submarine's position.
To ensure the stealthiness of its mission, it would have only turned on its sonar system in brief bursts to explore the way ahead while sailing in the waters with an unmapped complicated sea bottom at high speed. That is like driving in the fast lane of a highway while repeatedly opening and closing one's eyes. Which means "sound judgment, prudent decision-making and adherence to required procedures in navigation planning" would not avail the crew, who were navigating essentially on a wish and prayer.
The contradiction between the secrecy of the submarine's mission and the normal safe operating procedures of submarines mean that such an accident was inevitable at some point.
The presence of a "nuke sniffer" among US reconnaissance aircraft in the region after the accident, so-called because it is used to detect radioactive debris, suggests that the US was not convinced by its assurances that no radioactive substances leaked from the damaged vessel.
It is almost predictable that more experienced submarine commanders will be fired, and more advanced and expensive toys of the US Navy will be out of service if such risk-laden missions continue.
