中文
By Tao Wenzhao
Fifty years ago, then U.S. National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger paid a secret visit to China. At the time, China and the U.S. almost had no vessels for communication other than ambassador-level talks, and access to information was not as diverse as it is today.
Kissinger's trip in July 1971, which turned out to be a great success, was made possible after cautious, tentative, skeptical contacts between the two countries, with messages exchanged through third parties. It paved the way for President Richard Nixon's ice-breaking visit to China the following year, which marked the beginning of the normalization of bilateral ties.
How could China and the U.S., after 20 years living in isolation from and hostility towards each other, see their relations steered into a new direction by Kissinger's visit? Two reasons stand out. One is that both countries felt threatened by the expansion of the Soviet Union. While China saw the threat mainly from the lens of national security, for the U.S., the Soviet expansion in the Third World posed the biggest challenge to its global standing.
The other reason is that the two parties had a sincere and candid talk. Kissinger and Zhou Enlai directly touched upon the Taiwan issue, which was the most sensitive part of Sino-U.S. relations and also where the national interest of the two countries clashed most intensely. On Taiwan's political prospects, Kissinger promised that the U.S. government would not stand for a "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan" approach, nor would it support or encourage Taiwan "independence" movements.
China and the U.S., he added, would have zero conflict of interest after the resolution of the Taiwan issue, which could be realized in a relatively short time frame. Kissinger also foresaw that cross-strait relations would move in the direction set out by Beijing and promised that the U.S. would engage with China, never attack China and never collude with its allies or rivals against China.
These messages conveyed by Washington were the key to Sino-American reconciliation. Were China not made aware of such a position on the U.S. side, Nixon's upcoming trip would have broken no ice. Of course, normalization of relations took time, but what was important was that the process was started.
Fifty years on, Kissinger's China visit is still being remembered. Today, as Sino-U.S. relations come to yet another crossroad, people hope there will be another Henry Kissinger to bring America's China policy back on the track of engagement and constructive cooperation.
While this is understandable, both the international circumstances and the shape of bilateral relations look drastically different from what they were half a century ago, and so is the case with the two countries' internal situations.
Donald Trump's China policy, which was wrong to the core, dealt a deadly blow to bilateral relations. Much hope was placed on the new administration to right the wrong and bring China-U.S. relations back on track.
However, Washington under Biden, with its hands tied by all sorts of constraints, especially next year's mid-term elections, has inherited its predecessor's policies more than it has rectified them. The new government has called the bilateral relations a mix of competition, cooperation and conflict, openly claiming that "the period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end," that the U.S. policy toward China will now operate under "a new set of strategic parameters," and that "the dominant paradigm is going to be competition."
At the grand old age of 98, Dr. Kissinger still has his mind on China-U.S. relations and constantly shares his insightful views in this regard, both showing deep concern and sending out awakening alarms. After last year's U.S. general election, he has done several interviews with the media. A few of his views are particularly impressive.
First, when asked to comment on the initial thawing of relations between China and the U.S., Kissinger said, with firm belief, that the opening to China was a significant contribution to the world order, and that a wholesome adjustment of bilateral ties, which had evolved for 50 years, required wisdom on both sides. In a modern global system, he noted, the concepts of dominant and subordinate states would no longer work.
Second, on China's rejuvenation, Kissinger said nothing surprising about it as the country had been a great power across different historical periods over thousands of years. Nevertheless, he also mentioned that as a result of China's rejuvenation, the U.S. would have to, for the first time in history, deal with a country that was not just almost an economic equal, but also good at handling global affairs. In this sense, framing the right approach to China will be a great challenge for the United States.
Third, while asked about his views on the ideological differences between the two countries, Kissinger recalled the situation when the decision was made to normalize bilateral relations, saying that neither President Nixon nor he believed China's ideology would inevitably change as a result of the reconciliation. The real question in the future, he pointed out, would be about the extent to which ideological differences affect bilateral relations.
In his toast at a banquet honoring the Chinese Premier during his China visit in February 1972, Nixon said, "You believe deeply in your system, and we believe just as deeply in ours. It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hope…" This is in line with Kissinger's remarks. On what the Biden administration said about building an anti-China coalition of democracies, Kissinger said it was unwise to form a coalition against any country.
Fourth, Kissinger criticized Trump's excessive use of a maximally confrontational negotiation method and expressed his deep concern over the free fall of China-U.S. relations during the Trump years. Holding that the world should not slip into where it was prior to World War I, he believed that if China and the U.S. were allowed to be locked in an unchecked escalation of tensions, the world would descend into a disaster comparable to World War I.
Fifth, to avoid a disaster like this, Kissinger expressly said that he was "not in favor of a crusade against China," and that the U.S. should willingly accept coexistence. The two countries, he noted, should not seek to crush each other while pursuing their own values and goals, but put coexistence above dominance.
To this end, they needed to set positive objectives and abandon containment narratives, establish a mechanism between trusted representatives on the two sides to maintain high-level contacts, look for opportunities to cooperate – for example, those arising from the battle against COVID-19, and not perpetuate confrontation using modern technologies.
It is hoped that American decision-makers will heed Dr. Kissinger's warnings and advice and draw wisdom from them to avoid further U.S.-China confrontation, as well as the suffering it might subsequently inflict on the two countries and the rest of the international community.
The author is a senior research fellow at the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
